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The term Swedish model has been used to describe many different sets of conditions and 
policy areas. Originally, it was applied to the partnership between employer and union 
organisations in the labour market: centralised negotiations and industrial peace. The term has 
also been used to describe universal welfare policy, the mixed economy as an alternative to 
both capitalism and socialism, the consensus-and-compromise approach, and the historic 
compromise between social classes in the 1930s.
1 
In order to understand the Swedish model and the welfare policy in the post-war period, we 
must place developments in their proper economic historical context. This is how I would 
describe the situation: 
When the Swedish Social Democrats formulated their post-war programme at the end of 
the Second World War, the mass unemployment they had seen in the 1930s largely shaped 
their perceptions. Consequently, their vision for the future was: ‘A Society in Full 
Employment’. What the Social Democrats could not foresee was that the Swedish economy 
would grow strikingly as a result of the lengthy business boom that followed. Full 
employment developed of its own accord, so to speak, and the Social Democrats were able to 
take the credit. Inflation, not unemployment, became the principal economic headache. 
Economic policy sought to encourage labour supply and dampen demand. Sweden’s transition 
from a low-tax to a high-tax country can partly be explained by these developments. In the 
1950s, the government also introduced a competition policy to help make trade more 
competitive and thus reduce price increases.
2  
One of the architects of the Swedish model’s economic policies, Rudolf Meidner, wrote an 
article in the early 1990s entitled ‘The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model’. He argued that in 
purely economic terms, “the Swedish Model is a model for avoiding inflation in a full-
employment economy”. He also wrote that “full employment and equality are the goals that 
determine the rest of the model, both of them deeply rooted in the history of the labour 
movement”.
3 
Full employment raised living standards, boosted tax revenue and reduced social 
expenditure, which in turn created the scope for welfare reforms. It also led to strong trade 
unions and responsive employers. In this historic setting, centralised wage negotiations 
(collective bargaining) and a wage policy emphasising solidarity (or the Rehn-Meidner 
model) became cornerstones of the Swedish model. The negotiations were to keep down 
inflation and guarantee industrial peace. The policy of wage solidarity was to help direct the 
fairly limited workforce toward productive enterprises and sectors via relatively high levels of 
pay. This would curb inflation by reducing competition for labour, raise real wages, enhance 
                                                 
1 See for instance Magnusson 2000, Johansson and Magnusson 1998. 
2 Lundqvist 2000 and 2003. 
3 Meidner 1994: 338.   2
growth and hasten a productive restructuring process.
4 That, at least, was the theory. All too 
often, the Swedish model has been described in theoretical terms. My aim here is to lift the lid 
and examine what happened in reality. 
In principle, the centralised bargaining model between the social partners, the Swedish 
Employers' Confederation (SAF) and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), lasted 
from 1956 to 1983. I write ‘in principle’, as the most important actors broke away and 
negotiated separately, whereas SAF and LO continued negotiating throughout the 1980s. The 
engineering industry is a key actor in this area. Via its employer organisation, the Swedish 
Metal Trades Employers’ Association (VF), it had steered Swedish employer policy into new 
waters in the 1950s by “impelling” the SAF to engage in central wage negotiations, as one of 
those involved at the time put it.
5 For the next 25 years, the VF would remain a part of the 
giant employer collective led by the SAF. In the 1980s, however, it broke out on its own and 
persuaded its labour counterpart, the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union (Metall), to join it.
6 Why 
did this happen, and how? These are the key questions in this presentation. The study is based 
on an examination of board meeting minutes and other VF documents of key importance.  
 
An organisational explanation 
…collective interest depends at least as much on the way it is organised, as does the 
structure of the organisation on the interest it is to represent.
7 
From the 1980s, the bargaining system in the Swedish labour market was gradually 
decentralised to the industrial branch level. At the same time, centralised state authority was 
decentralised to the municipal level. This parallel development unquestionably shared the 
same underlying causes. Ideology, for instance, was an important factor.
8 From the early 
1980s, we see the development of an ideological current emphasising competition and market 
solutions rather than centralism and planning. This was followed by a doctrinal shift in 
economic policy emphasising competition and low inflation rather than full employment.
9 
These shifts of emphasis were to have an impact on both state organisation and the employer 
organisations. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, structural changes in the economy reinforced this new trend. 
Organisational changes in the industrial sector towards flexibility and greater international 
mobility underlined the need for decentralised solutions in respect of collective agreements as 
                                                 
4 See for instance Erixon 2003. 
5 Albåge 1996: 123. For a comprehensive account of the Swedish employers’ actions and strategies in the 
20th century, see Kjellberg 2000. 
6 This was a controversial step within both the SAF and the LO. Within the LO, Metall was strongly 
criticised for having created division in the Swedish negotiating model, see De Geer 1992 and Johansson 
and Magnusson 1998. Over the next few years, bargaining took place at both central and federation level. 
In 1986, however, the VF finally decided to negotiate without SAF participation. In 1981, the VF had 
called for the SAF to be deprived of its bargaining responsibilities. In 1990, this came about. The new 
employer policy was to be based on decentralisation and marketisation. 
7 
 Schmitter and Streeck 1985: 19. 
8 A growing lack of trust between the partners has been cited as an explanation for the collapse of the 
Swedish model, see Rothstein 2000. Stråth 1998, on the other hand, views the model’s decline in terms of 
a deeper ideological process of change in which employee funds played a major part.   
9 Lundqvist 2003, Lindvall 2004.
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well. Increased globalisation affected both ideology and the way structures were changed. 
However, it was the technological innovations providing a backdrop to these developments 
that made the whole process possible. 
These ideological and structural changes have been crucial to the institutional transition 
that the Swedish bargaining model has undergone. To describe institutional change as a result 
only of external factors, however, would be to misrepresent history. The grand functionalist 
interpretations fail to take into account an important lesson that history teaches us – that all 
institutional change also has its own inner dynamic. Actors can influence the course of events 
by seeking to further their own interests. In this article, I hope to show the importance of the 
inner process as a factor in the ‘collapse’ of the Swedish negotiating model. The 
organisational explanation that the study arrives at does not conflict with the change in other 
factors outlined above. Rather, the purpose is to seek a more profound explanation of the 
process that led to institutional transformation. 
The golden years of collaboration between the social partners were the 1950s and 1960s. 
The partnership deteriorated as a result of the radicalisation of Swedish politics in the 1970s, 
to which the LO contributed with its controversial proposals for employee funds and 
legislation instead of agreements in the industrial law sphere. The political aspect was 
particularly important at the time, but in order to understand and explain the actions of the VF 
we need to study its role and its experience of employer policy under the Swedish model. 
Citing political developments or stiffer international competition, or new systems of 
production, is not enough. In the early 1980s, only a few however important companies were 
involved in this process of change. The major changes in company organisation were to come 
later. The timing was not right for this type of structural explanation to the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining. Also, employer policy has never been a purely instrumental function of 
economic and technological realities.  
Throughout the period, the competitive export companies in the VF showed their 
dissatisfaction with the employer policies being pursued. As I see it, the employers’ 
experience of their own policies and organisational development is crucial to an explanation 
of the changes that took place in the Swedish model. But market mechanisms, too, have been 
an important force for change. Here, the term market mechanisms refers to the competition 
for labour that arose between companies as a result of full employment. Perhaps the most 
important task of employer policy during this period of full employment was to pursue a 
collective wage policy, which is a way of trying to deal with market mechanisms. Studying 
how employers deal with labour competition is an unusual line of approach in labour market 
research. Previous research on wage formation, however, shows that market forces had a 
considerable impact on wages in the engineering industry.
10 Emphasis in the present article is 
on the impact of market mechanisms on organisational change in the institution we will refer 
to here as the employer collective.  
Organisations change over time, partly as a result of the problems they have to tackle. This 
process is not without its problems, however. Research on business organisations has shown 
that there is a conflict between efficient negotiation and organisational democracy. An 
organisation must speak with one voice to gain the trust of the other side in a bargaining 
process. If it has different voices sending different signals, it has difficulty gaining that trust. 
This principle is referred to here as the control principle and is based on what is termed the 
logic of influence. Cohesion in an organisation, meanwhile, is dependent upon members 
having a sense of participation. In an organisation where this is weak, there is a risk that 
agreements will not be respected. Small firms may feel overlooked in an organisation 
dominated by large corporations. Representativity issues come under the second principle, 
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that of the logic of membership. The question before us here is whether a growing 
representation problem was present, and if so whether this contributed to the decentralisation 
of employer policy. Analysis of this organisational problem, then, applies the concepts of 
representativity and control.
11 In the present study, these terms are linked to the question of 
horizontal and vertical expansion in employer organisations.
12  
In the horizontal dimension in the analytical model, competition and collaboration in the 
wage policy sphere are also studied. Wage drift (wage increases over and above negotiated 
increases) is treated as a competitive problem where solutions are sought via what is referred 
to here as cartel collaboration. 
 
Competition and wage drift 
After the Second World War, the international business upturn led to an industrial boom in 
Sweden. A labour shortage ensued, creating competition for this scarce resource in the 
manufacturing sector and between this and other sectors. Labour supply was boosted both by 
means of campaigns that sought to bring married women into the labour market and as a 
result of a comparatively large influx of labour immigration up until 1970.
13  
Competition varied in intensity over time, but was present to a greater or lesser degree 
throughout the period. It was characterised by high mobility in the industrial sector, especially 
around 1950, and wage drift. Naturally, wage drift had other causes as well, such as the 
difficulty of controlling piecework rates. But wage drift in relation to piecework, too, was a 
problem associated with boom periods. Companies needed to produce quickly and efficiently, 
and keeping down piecework rates was often a secondary concern.   
The unions took advantage of their position of strength to focus on low-paid groups at the 
bargaining table (wage solidarity). The employers for their part wanted pay differentials 
between occupational categories. This in fact contributed to wage drift, as companies 
deliberately re-set the pay scale when low-paid workers were granted rises. 
Wage drift was at its highest in piecework industries, which meant that industries with 
little piecework fell behind in terms of wage growth. In competing for labour, companies 
were anxious not to lose too much ground. In some cases, employers recommended higher 
pay rises than those demanded by the union. One example of this was the employer 
organisation for Swedish breweries in the 1950s.
14 
Under these circumstances, which encouraged wage drift and pushed up inflation, 
employers saw coordination of wage negotiations as the best option in the 1950s. They 
viewed centrally coordinated negotiations between the two confederations, the SAF and the 
LO, as a cartel strategy that would enable them to keep down wage increases, especially local 
wage drift, and at the same time make it harder for the unions to play off one employer 
against another.  
Competition is of course only one factor causing wage drift. Wage levels were also 
affected by expectations concerning inflation. Actors, however, do not base their behaviour on 
the actual state of affairs but on their perceptions of reality, which in turn may be influenced 
by their scope for action. They may sometimes adopt a particular position for strategic 
                                                 
11 Van Waarden 1992 explores the terms control and representativity more closely. In a previous study, 
Lundqvist 1995 and 1998a, I used these terms in analysing trade organisation.  
12 De Geer 1992 employs a similar approach when applying three analytical concepts in his study of the SAF: the 
principle of negotiation, the principle of association and the principle of insurance. The first two principles 
largely correspond to control and representativity.  
13 Lundqvist 2000 & 2004. 
14 Lundqvist 1998b.   5
reasons. The interesting point in the present connection is that the Swedish employers actually 
viewed competition for labour as the principal cause of wage drift. 
In 1957, the VF conducted an extensive survey among its members, and those companies 
that reported wage drift were asked to explain the reasons for it. Conditions varied from area 
to area, but labour competition was described as one of the leading causes. Despite the fact 
that the companies felt the problem of wage drift was out of their hands, many tried to solve it 
by means of internal controls. Many other members, however, urged VF to increase its degree 
of control and encourage unity among employers.
15 
The wage drift problem subsequently plagued the Swedish bargaining model for decades. 
Employers failed to cope with it despite strenuous efforts, which I will not go into here. On 
the contrary, both contractual pay increases and wage drift continued to rise in the 1960s and 
up until the mid-1970s. Every year between 1956 and 1970, wage drift exceeded contractual 
pay increases in the engineering industry. If bargaining led to a pay rise of 4% in a particular 
year, wage drift perhaps added a further 5%, which meant a total increase of 9%. 
The extensive wage increases paid out between 1974 and 1977 caused the VF to lose faith 
in the centralised bargaining model. Although the increases fell back to more normal levels in 
1978, they remained high, and the situation was further aggravated by the arrival of statutory 
labour legislation. High wage drift in the mid-1970s was caused by high industrial profits and 
wildcat strikes at the local level. Wildcat strikes tended to be seen as a means of bringing 
pressure to bear on employers in local wage negotiations.
16   
From a wage perspective, employer policy in the Swedish model was often a failure. One 
should not forget, however, that the model succeeded in keeping conflicts to a minimum in 
the industrial sector. Between the two world wars, the number of lost workdays remained at a 
constantly high level. It was not until 1942 that the industrial conflict rate reached the low 
level it was to remain at after the war. A major strike by metalworkers in 1945 was only a 
temporary setback.
17 The least contentious years in the history of the Swedish labour market 
were those between 1956 and 1965, which shows that the centralised bargaining model was 
successful in ensuring industrial peace. In fact, it was not until the late 1960s that it began to 
fail in this respect. There was a general rise in industrial disputes in the 1970s, culminating in 
a major conflict in 1980. The fact that the model worked less well over time contributed to the 
decision to phase it out. 
In the VF, centralisation and joint negotiation were blamed for the high wage increases. 
Starting in the early 1970s, employers discussed a return to bargaining at the association level. 
The number of executive committee members who favoured decentralisation grew by the 
year. Following the surge in wage increases in the mid-1970s, the VF took a decision in 
principle to withdraw from the joint SAF-LO negotiations. However, it did not want to upset 
the first non-socialist government for 44 years by winding down the Swedish negotiating 
model during its first year in office. Also, the executive committee was not unanimous, and 
preferred consensus. Other factors that contributed to the VF’s difficulty in reaching a 
                                                 
15 VF archives. Compilation and processing of survey data from 1957.  
16 For reasons of space, the diagrams showing the relationship between wage agreements and wage drift 
are not shown here. This data is available in, inte alia, Arbetsmarknadsstatistisk årsbok 1994 and Bergom 
Larsson 1985: 375. 
17 The Saltsjöbaden Agreement between the social partners, dating from 1938, has been accorded 
considerable significance by historians describing the Swedish model. Although it focused on conflict 
management, the biggest industrial dispute in the history of the Swedish Metal Trades Employers’ 
Association occurred in 1945. The basic cause, however, was that communists had temporarily gained 
control of the Metalworkers’ Union leadership.   6
decision was that the SAF had elected a new chair (Curt Nicolin) and that the new industrial 
law necessitated collaboration.  
In 1982, the VF finally took the step and withdrew from the centralised bargaining 
arrangement. It was prompted in this by conflicts with the LO in 1980 and with the Union of 
Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry (SIF) in1981. Otherwise, 1982 seemed an apt 
moment for the VF to reach such a decision: employee funds were in the offing and the Social 
Democrats won the election, Volvo introduced a profit-sharing system for its employees as a 
politically motivated rebuff to employee funds, demand for labour in the engineering industry 
was at its lowest since the war, and the LO had appointed a new, unproven leader (Stig 
Malm). But none of these factors actually caused the breakaway. The events of 1982 simply 
helped to speed up a decision-making process that was already far advanced and in itself 
logical.  
To sum up, full employment led to labour competition and extensive wage drift. The 
employers sought to solve the competitive problem by means of a cartel strategy with 
centralised bargaining. This model did not solve the problem, and the VF sought new paths, 
both within the model and outside it. 
 
The importance of organisation 
Organisational aspects are of major importance when discussing employers’ problems in 
relation to competition and collaboration, and also when discussing control and 
representativity. Employer organisations function as one side at the collective bargaining table 
and must be able to pursue a common policy vis-à-vis the unions. Organisational aspects are 
evident everywhere. To begin with, we have the VF’s place in the larger SAF community. We 
also have the question of its internal organisation. Employers sought some of the solutions to 
their problems in organisational change.  
 
The VF’s place in the employer collective 
The SAF (1902) and the VF (1896) developed along parallel lines up until 1917, when the VF 
joined the SAF and became formally subordinate to this executive organisation. From the 
outset, the VF was its largest member. In 1917, almost a fifth of all workers in SAF member 
companies were employed in the engineering sector. By 1975, this figure had grown to over 
27 per cent. Also, the average engineering company was larger than the average SAF 
company. As the SAF became broader based, however, the proportion of engineering 
companies in the confederation steadily diminished (table 1).  
Furthermore, VF members included a large number of the country’s international 
companies, many of which were growing rapidly. The 15 largest member companies in 1952, 
ranked according to the size of their workforce, were: ASEA, LM Ericsson, SKF, Götaverken, 
Husqvarna vapenfabrik, Kockums, SAAB, Elektrolux, Eriksberg, Bolinder-Munktell, Scania-
Vabis, AGA, Atlas Diesel, Volvo och Svenska Järnvägsverkstäderna.
18 Almost all were 
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Table 1. Relative size of the VF in the SAF 1917-1985. 
 
   A B C  D 
  Year  VF share of  Share of  Employees in  Employees in 
    SAF companies employees  VF  SAF  
   %    %  companies  companies  
 1917  12.6  19.8  -  - 
 1930  9.9  20.0  -  - 
 1945  8.7  21.9  -  - 
 1955  7.7  26.1  175  51 
 1965  6.6  24.8  188  50 
 1975  7.4  27.4  178  48 
 1985  5.8  27.0  136  29 
 
A: VF share of SAF member companies. B: VF share of employees in SAF member companies.  
C: Average number of employees in VF companies. D: Average number of employees in SAF companies. 
Source: SAF and VF annual reports. 
 
Due to their position both within the SAF and in the Swedish business sector in general, 
the VF and its leading member companies have always had a significant influence on 
employer policy. The VF played a key part in bringing about the centralisation of bargaining 
and later, in the 1980s, of its decentralisation.  
Following the costly agreements concluded in the mid-1970s, the VF decided to try and 
reform the bargaining system. In particular it was anxious to secure greater representation on 
the SAF board so as to be able to influence the central negotiations between the SAF and the 
LO, and had high hopes of succeeding in this aim. But the SAF introduced an amendment 
whereby the VF would only be allowed four seats on the 32-strong board, although this 
eventually became five. The head of the VF argued that mathematically, considering its size, 
the Association was entitled to eight of the 32 seats. Thus the VF’s wish to be given greater 
representation was not fully granted.  
The fact that the VF did not enjoy full proportional representation on the SAF board was 
due to the consideration shown the smaller employer associations. The VF companies had 
some 365,000 employees, or 27 per cent of the employees affiliated to the SAF. The smallest 
employer organisations represented companies with a combined total of 3,000-5,000 
employees. This imbalance made fair representation difficult. Under the existing arrangement 
supported by the SAF, an organisation had to represent companies with at least 15,000 wage-
earners to qualify for a seat on the board. The VF’s call for this threshold to be raised was 
rejected.  
The board representation issue had several different dimensions. Besides being an attempt 
to strengthen the VF’s standing in general, it also concerned the Association’s inner cohesion. 
The Managing Director of the VF argued that the engineering industry comprised a 
heterogeneous gathering of companies and that in principle it could be divided up into a 
number of different national associations. If the demands for proportional representation on 
the SAF board were met, it would be easier for the various groupings to pursue their 
respective interests. 
A representative of the smaller companies in the VF argued for instance that the 
Association should insist on proportional representation as the SAF board functioned as a 
negotiating partner. If this demand were not met, the VF should consider breaking away from 
the SAF. Also, the representation of small undertakings needed improving. Despite the fact 
that 28 per cent of all wage-earners in the engineering industry were employed by small 
businesses, these were only represented by one deputy member on the board. There was no 
sign of any “democratisation” in the SAF’s proposal. Unless representation was improved,   8
there was a risk that smaller companies in the industry would break away. Another 
representative of the small-business group in the VF also declared that the possibility of SAF 
being “blown apart” could not be ruled out. The major engineering companies, however, 
argued that the representation issue concerned much more than just the relationship between 
large and small members. The main thing was to ensure that the country’s competitive 
industry was adequately represented on the SAF board. As voting was not practised there, the 
presence of competent individuals on the board was of far greater importance than the number 
of board members. 
The large companies urged that the export industry be given more influence, while the 
small businesses wanted greater representativity. The VF thus faced a dilemma: if it came out 
in support of the former approach, it risked jeopardising internal cohesion, while if it chose 
the latter, more democratic course advocated by the small businesses, this would weaken the 
interests of the large member companies. As the larger companies wielded more clout, the VF 
chose the former course. The Association’s expansion of its regional organisation along with 
increased collaboration at the local level (see below) could however be seen as a way of 
circumventing this problem.  
 
The administrative office 
The VF head office also grew in size in the 1950s. As in most organisations at this time, the 
number of staff increased, but there was no appreciable increase in the amount of 
bureaucracy. Even in the 1960s, a decade of bureaucratic expansion in Sweden, the VF 
remained a manageable organisation. The 40-strong workforce in the early 1950s grew to 128 
in 1973, including three regional offices, a publishing and printing store and a foundry school. 
The new administrative setup introduced in 1973 did not bring any major changes. The VF 
sought to increase its range of skills by establishing specialist departments for industrial law 
and for public issues. Liaison groups were also set up to coordinate certain areas. At this time, 
there was little economic scope for dramatic improvements in the organisational regime. As 
costs in the industry had increased, companies were opposed to paying more to belong to an 
organisation. In the same year, Sven Schwartz, former head of the SAF, presented a report on 
the prospects for setting up a national body to be known as the Swedish Business 
Confederation. The proposal was rejected by the VF as it disapproved both of centralisation 
and of the costs involved.
19 
Later, in 1991, the administrative situation would change radically when the Swedish 
Metal Trades Employers’ Association (VF) merged with the Swedish Association for Metal 
Transforming, Mechanical and Electromechanical Engineering Industries to form a new 
national organisation, the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries (VI). The chief 
reasons cited for this move were synergy gains and lower costs. 
 
Small businesses 
The question of allowing family businesses and other small enterprises into the VF was 
discussed even before the Second World War. The Association’s Managing Director between 
the wars, George Styrman, notes in his well-informed account of the period that there was 
“considerable doubt” as to the advisability of admitting small businesses. The problem was 
both the potential loss of homogeneity in the VF and these companies’ tendency to behave in 
a “changeable” manner.
20 
In the 1950s, however, the VF began actively recruiting small businesses. Why? We 
should start by noting that these companies created numerous problems for the SAF. Labour 
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shortages led to competition both between companies and between industries, and also 
between large and small businesses. The SAF saw that labour was being attracted away from 
larger companies to smaller ones and therefore sought to incorporate the latter into the 
employer collective, which at this time was dominated by the interests of big business. The 
SAF felt it was being damaged by the “dabbling” of the small-business organisations in the 
bargaining field. Accordingly, it sought to recruit not only small industrial companies but also 
organisations representing artisans and retailers.
21 
In the 1950s, further employers’ organisations became members of the SAF, representing 
paint-spraying shops, the leather industry, bakeries and pastry shops, and plater’s shops. In the 
1960s, they were joined by the painting contractors, the hotel and catering trade, the retail 
trade and the insurance industry.
22 
The SAF’s transition from an employer organisation representing big business to an 
organisation representing more or less the entire private business sector naturally had 
important implications. The VF blamed the SAF’s “inadequate power of resistance” against 
union claims on this development. 
Competition for labour was complicated by the fact that the employer organisations, not 
least the VF, had a relatively low degree of coverage among their own industries. Among 
companies with at least 6 employees, little more than a third belonged to the VF. It was 
largely the small businesses that remained outside. A count of small businesses entitled to join 
the VF in 1953 showed that there were 980 potential member companies. In 1957, the number 
of VF member companies with 10 employees or fewer was no more than 262. 
In view of the relatively low level of affiliation to the VF, recruitment became an essential 
means of coming to grips with wage formation. This in fact was a concern for the employer 
collective as a whole, and consequently a special SAF recruitment officer was appointed in 
the 1950s. The campaign to attract small engineering companies also resulted in them being 
given two seats on the VF board, along with the Association’s five regions.  
By 1968, over 1,000 engineering companies, employing about 23,000 people were still not 
affiliated to the VF. The majority of these companies had fewer than 50 employees. Only 48 
had more than 50. 
The number of small businesses in the engineering industry grew steadily. The VF, too, 
grew in size, due to its emphasis on recruiting. During the period in which wage negotiations 
were centralised, the number of VF member companies doubled from just over 1,100 to about 
2,300. The number of employees in the VF bargaining fold increased by over 60 per cent and 
totalled 315,000 in 1985. As a result of this upswing, the VF was almost as large in the mid-
1980s as the whole SAF had been in the 1930s.
23 
The question of small-business representation was not properly solved in the 1950s and 
1960s. Two seats on the VF board was not considered satisfactory. In the 1970s, fears were 
expressed in some quarters that the interests of small businesses were not being properly 
looked after in the organisation. As small businesses were so poorly represented in the 
Association, the critics said, the large companies ruled. This was even truer of the SAF, where 
no provisions whatsoever were made for small-business representation.  
 
Regional organisation and local collaboration 
The immediate post-war period was a time of unrest in the Swedish labour market, as it was 
in the VF. The big metalworkers’ strike of 1945 had severely tested employer unity. In a bid 
to bring member companies closer together, a committee in the VF proposed that meetings be 
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held to discuss the labour supply situation. Engineering companies were competing with one 
another over labour, which led to proposals for the appointment of special workplace 
representatives. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, regional and local organisations were 
expanded. 
In 1962, it was felt that the VF’s regional organisation was under-dimensioned. Eight 
representatives spread across five regions was not enough to provide the Association’s 1,800 
member companies with the level of service they required. In the new organisation, the 
number of representatives was increased to 18. The increasingly complicated pay categories 
and wage-setting methods meant the small and medium-sized businesses needed assistance. 
This applied particularly to the problem of wage drift, which needed dealing with in a 
practical manner. Moreover, the arrival of additional representatives facilitated local 
collaboration between member companies. The idea was for local collaboration both to 
prevent members outbidding one another and to prevent the unions from playing off one 
employer against another, in light of the labour shortage. In other words, local collaboration 
was to curb wage drift. A further reason for building up the VF’s regional organisation was a 
need to respond to the growth of local union organisations.  
In time, the organisational expansion that occurred in the 1960s also proved insufficient. 
Between 1976 and 1979, the five regional offices became 12. Wage drift was still the problem 
facing this enlarged organisation. The annual report for 1979 noted: “In 1979, too, increased 
staff resources and greater personal contact with member organisations contributed 
significantly to the task of combating unsustainable wage drift”. Expansion of the VF’s 
regional organisation was undertaken in close collaboration with the SAF, which also 
strengthened its regional organisation. 
Although regional expansion was a relatively uncontroversial measure within VF, some 
critical voices were raised. It was argued, for instance, that apart from the extra costs 
involved, the move increased the power of the representatives. Others noted the problem of 
running 12 different districts and the risk that issues requiring joint consultation would 
become matters for central negotiation. The proximity of the local representatives might lead 
to such a development, when instead such issues should be settled at company level. Thus 
decentralisation might lead to centralisation. The VF leadership was aware that management 
problems might develop as a result of the rise in information costs, but felt that these were 
outweighed by the benefits, not least the likelihood of swifter negotiations and the possibility 
of delegating bargaining to the regions in certain cases. Volvo was even prepared to help 
develop regional services without delay by providing training programmes for regional 
representatives.  
The local collaboration groups had to be separated from the regional organisation. These 
were the result of a VF initiative and were the VF’s responsibility, but they were not part of 
the VF in any formal sense. Local collaboration had been on the decline in the early 1960s, 
which prompted the VF to seek to revitalise it. In southern Sweden, not a single local group 
was in action in 1962, although the stated requirement was 9 groups. In western Sweden, only 
2 of the original 5 groups were still functioning, while the requirement was 7. In eastern 
Sweden, the level of activity was much higher: the region had as many as 9 groups, although a 
further 3 were wanted. The northern region had 6 local groups, of which 3 were in the same 
town. There were also 3 dormant groups. In addition, a further 11 groups were sought. In sum, 
local collaboration was only working properly in eastern Sweden, while the situation was 
particularly disheartening in the southern and western parts of the country. 
The VF’s efforts to revive local collaboration bore fruit. Its annual reports show that the 
number of groups rose from about 40 in 1965 to 90 in 1975 and 107 in 1983. Most of the 
groups involved only engineering companies, but in some cases other SAF companies also 
took part. In areas where non-SAF companies were of importance for wage policy, these, too,   11
were sometimes members of a local collaboration group. In the mid-1960s, the SAF became 
interested. It felt such groups were needed throughout the private labour market as a means of 
improving cooperation between employers on pay issues. The aim was quite simply to reduce 
labour competition and curb wage drift. 
A SAF survey of local collaboration groups looked into the situation at 55 of them, 31 of 
which were exclusively VF affiliated. The survey shows that the VF groups usually had 5-10 
members, that managing directors and job study managers usually took part, that the groups 
met four times a year, that most of them exchanged pay statistics, and that over 60 per cent of 
them had agreed not to “steal people”, as they called it, from one another. In other words they 
opposed labour poaching.  
The question was, however, how to bring smaller businesses into the local collaboration 
programme. In 1971, for instance, 771 of the 1,751 member companies were active in local 
groups. Although nearly 1,000 member companies were not involved in local collaboration, 
the 771 companies that were involved represented 76 per cent of member company 
employees.  
As the aim of local collaboration was to promote unity between employers, it is 
worthwhile examining how this problem was viewed at local level. In 1975, it was generally 
felt that the problems were considerable. The VF leadership consequently met with the 
executive committees of cooperation groups in three areas of eastern Sweden. These 
employers expressed considerable concern about what was happening in the labour market. 
They found the increasing lack of unity among employers “frightening”. Disloyal employers, 
even in the same geographical area, were said to be letting wage drift “soar”. They also 
expressed surprise that wage drift was being allowed to continue without any response from 
the central-level organisations in the form of sanctions. Another problem was the tendency to 
“disregard established forms of pay” by switching from incentive wages to more fixed wages. 
Many of the problems were attributed to a lack of strong organisation. Local branches of the 
Metalworkers’ Union were said to apply a tactic involving “strategic approaches” that were 
“downright military in character”. This tactic involved “steamrollering the weakest employer 
in the area in order to set a precedent, on the basis of which they went about crushing 
resistance among the other employers”. The solution to the problem, it was felt, was to 
strengthen regional organisation and review the division of regions. 
One problem with the local groups was the fact that the heads of larger companies often 
chose not to attend meetings but delegated the task to one of their subordinates. This meant 
that collaboration was not always accorded high priority. In the late 1970s, therefore, to make 
local collaboration more efficient, the VF began organising regional meetings for managing 
directors. At these meetings, members discussed “policy matters, etc, relating to the question 
of employer solidarity in such areas as wage growth, co-determination and the companies’ 
involvement in local collaboration groups”.  
In expanding its regional organisation and local collaboration, the VF was driven by a 
desire to control or discipline the competition between employers that was causing wage drift. 
The employers reasoned that if organisations were closer to the market, there was a better 
chance of success. The 1970s also brought a need for service and guidance to member 
companies, not least small businesses, in connection with the new laws on security of 
employment and co-determination in decision-making.  
While decentralisation was designed to solve certain organisational problems, it also meant 
that negotiations at the industrial branch level – when they were subsequently introduced – 
were more likely to succeed. Also, broader regional organisation and local collaboration was a 
way of meeting the demands of small businesses for greater representation, or at least a way 
of making them feel they were playing a bigger part in employer policy affairs. 
Organisationally, regional organisation and local collaboration were two different things, but   12
to some degree they shared the same logic. The expansion of VF’s regional organisation was 
partly intended to boost local collaboration, which was a voluntary scheme, albeit a VF 
initiative. Although it may have brought the market closer, it was nevertheless market forces 
that were to be regulated. Local collaboration was in essence a local cartel activity aimed at 
reducing competition over pay. The cartel operation had been decentralised. 
It should also be borne in mind that while the proportion of VF companies in the SAF 
declined, VF company employees as a proportion of the total number of employees in SAF 
companies increased. The growing importance of the engineering industry in the Swedish 
economy, however, was not reflected in its degree of influence in the SAF. Once SAF had 
closed the door on a joint organisational approach, the VF had no alternative but to develop 
its own organisation as a means of strengthening its influence in the labour market.  
 
Employers’ dilemmas in the Swedish model 
 
Control or representativity  
Organisationally, the problem facing employer bodies is how to exercise control. Companies 
join the organisation voluntarily, pay a membership fee, relinquish their right of decision in 
certain respects, and as a result expect to be able to influence the organisation’s activities. 
Organisational logic, meanwhile, suggests that to make itself heard, an organisation must 
speak with one voice, at least externally. In other words, there is a built-in conflict between 
representativity and efficiency.  
The argument concerning representativity is as follows. The members of an organisation 
must be able to recognise their own interests in the organisation’s policies. If they are unable 
to do so, there is a good chance that their loyalty will subside or that they will even leave the 
organisation. Representativity could be said to necessitate small, homogeneous organisations. 
If the organisation becomes too large, decentralisation is required to meet the needs of those 
represented. Decentralisation is quite simply crucial to organisational cohesion. 
Regarding efficiency, the argument is that when an organisation goes to the bargaining 
table, it must be credible in the eyes of the partner. This is particularly important in the case of 
an employer organisation that is involved in negotiations on a regular basis. A bargaining 
body cannot represent all the disparate interests of its members. Management must have 
control of the operation. A controlling organisation, therefore, pursues policies that benefit the 
collective rather than its individual members.
24 Employer organisations must, for instance, be 
able to mobilise their members for a lockout, even if such a course may be to the detriment of 
certain members in the short term. This principle is best served by large organisations with 
centralised decision-making structures. 
This argument also has an historical dimension. The employer organisations founded in the 
early 20
th century began as miminalistic, representative bodies. In time, they increasingly 
assumed the character of controlling organisations. The growth of bargaining activities and 
membership, along with the growing potential for self-regulation, or cartels, necessitated 
centralisation and greater control. Rising membership led to a more heterogeneous array of 
interests, which imposed special demands on a controlling organisation. There is always a risk 
that growth and centralisation alienate members. Greater regional organisation may be a 
means of reducing the distance between executive and membership. In an organisation 
striving for greater control, regional expansion only comes about once power has been 
centralised. 
                                                 
24 When organisations pursue policies, they also create those policies. Accordingly, they may be viewed as 
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One mark of an organisation striving for closer control is greater professionalism. The first 
step is to appoint a neutral official who cannot be suspected of representing any particular 
interests. This is an important step when organisations seek to regulate the relationship 
between competitors. In the historical case, these officials eventually came to lead the work of 
an administrative office comprising a small or larger number of subordinate officials. They 
then came to be referred to as directors. Their brief was inward communication within the 
organisation and outward communication vis-à-vis bargaining partners such as the unions or 
the state. They were responsible for compiling information, and represented continuity as one 
board succeeded another. This gave them a position of power far in excess of their formal 
work specifications. The employers on the board allowed this to happen, often finding it 
convenient to let a professional officer deal with the increasingly complicated issues in hand. 
They already had their hands full running their companies. Both the SAF and the VF have had 
very strong-willed heads wielding a considerable amount of power.  
As we have seen, the organisations were required to strike a balance between control and 
representativity. Where the point of equilibrium lies is however difficult to determine. It tends 
to vary from organisation to organisation. As organisations are constantly undergoing change 
as a result of external developments, they are constantly seeking the right balance. These 
principles may be applied in the case of VF, and also to some extent in the case of SAF. They 
can help to explain the organisational changes that were introduced in the employers’ 
organisations.  
The vertical dilemma – striking a balance between control and representativity – was a 
multi-layered problem. Here, we have discussed the issue in connection with the VF. The 
vertical dilemma, however, was very much a reflection of the same dilemma throughout the 
SAF community. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, the SAF as a whole grew dramatically. 
Both they and the VF sought to improve control by broadening and deepening their 
organisations. This was part of the cartel strategy. The goal of a broader organisation was 
partly achieved by recruiting additional members, including smaller companies, the principal 
aim being to control wage formation. Small businesses soon discovered that their views were 
making little impact. Thus the organisations had a representation problem. 
Meanwhile, the average size of SAF member companies was declining overall. The 
organisation that emerged in the early 1980s was very different from the one that operated in 
the 1950s. The VF’s drive for greater representation in the SAF was a reflection of this 
organisational change. The fact that the largest employer body in the collective felt that its 
interests were not being properly looked after was of course untenable. The SAF argued that 
the small organisations had to be represented as well. The problem was that the SAF had 
grown so large that it was no longer able to take all members’ interests into account at the 
bargaining table. 
In theory, an organisation should strive for control and rise above individual interests. This 
was precisely what the SAF had done, and which now led to a backlash in the form of the 
representativity problem. The control strategy became increasingly unviable. As the 
stumbling block was lack of representativity in central negotiations, the SAF had eventually 
to choose between two different approaches. Either it decentralised bargaining to association 
level and kept the employer collective together in a joint organisation, or it continued as 
before, ignored the problems and risked seeing the organisation break up from within. The 
SAF chose the latter course, but was saved by VF breaking away from central bargaining and 
negotiating with its union partner on its own. A few years later, the SAF realised its dilemma 
and withdrew as a negotiating party. By that time, neo-liberalism had provided the ideological 
framework for this inevitable development. In moving towards greater control, the 
organisation had reached a point at which it was forced to decentralise in accordance with the 
logic of representativity.    14
 
Competition and collaboration 
Employer organisations seek to pursue a common policy on employer issues. The extent to 
which they succeed in this aim depends on the degree of cooperation between employers, but 
also on the strength and policies of the unions and of the state. It is unwise, however, to say 
anything about the impact of union and state actions on employer policies without first 
seeking to determine the inner strength of the employers, which is closely bound up with their 
ability to solve the problems of competition and collaboration. Moreover, the most important 
area of activity, wage formation, is fraught with such problems. This affects employer policy 
as a whole. The difficulties that arise in connection with the regulation of a dynamic factor 
such as the market are in fact at the heart of the employers’ competitive problems.  
In the analytical model I have applied, the horizontal dimension is represented by the 
‘opposing pair’ of competition and collaboration. In practice, they exist side by side and are 
not mutually exclusive. Cartels, for instance, seek to limit competition, but they can never 
eliminate it. The model should therefore be viewed as a ‘functional’ one in the sense of more 
or less competition on a sliding scale. The focal point is company action over wage 
agreements. In the ideal case, companies oppose wage increases over and above contractual 
increases, and no competition-related wage drift occurs. Cooperation here is at a maximum. 
The companies keep to the agreed wage levels. 
The larger the number of companies that allow wage drift, the further we move along the 
sliding scale towards competition. In the ideal case, maximal competition is achieved when 
none of the companies comply with collective agreements regulating pay, or rather simply see 
them as minimum levels. A common misconception otherwise is that the absence of a 
collective agreement results in maximal competition. It would be unwise, however, to 
underrate the fact that collective agreements sometimes lead to greater competition as a result 
of their information-bearing function. Not until actors have access to pay statistics can they 
compete over wages in an informed and rational way. 
In the early 1980s, the employers analysed their own policies. In order to understand them 
properly, they applied the cartel concept. An internal report claimed that cartel building had 
always been a key element in employer activities. This was clear, for instance, from Point 1 in 
the Statement of Aims: “to unite employers and employer organisations in a permanent 
body”. The cartel function meant “adopting measures that are directly binding upon the 
partner companies”, or setting labour prices in joint negotiations. At this time, it should be 
added, the SAF’s cartel activities were a matter of some dispute. This is illustrated, for 
instance, by the VF’s decision to break away from the central SAF-LO negotiations. In an 
internal memorandum, the VF criticised the cartel function then in evidence: 
 
There is a risk that the SAF, as a result of this cartel function, will become an organisation that is inwardly 
strong but outwardly weak. Too much energy is being spent on finding a common denominator linking the 
interests of the various employer associations. It then becomes impossible to forcefully promote vital trade 
interests beyond general ‘minimum interests’, as the SAF collective as a whole is hardly prepared to fight on 
behalf of special interests.
25 
 
The problems of centrally coordinated negotiations are equated here with the negative aspects 
of the cartel operation. In the 1980s, marketisation was a keyword and cartel building as a 
strategy was beginning to be seen as an anachronism. 
One option is to view the cartel as just one of a range of functions found in employer 
organisations. Keith Sissons, an industrial relations expert, identifies six characteristic 
functions: cartel, aggressive opponent, pressure group, negotiator, problem solver and 
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consultant.
26 The cartel function involves – or seeks to create – a common set of conditions 
with which members must comply, concerning things like pay, wage systems, working hours 
and recruitment. Thus it is more a question of employer relations than industrial relations. 
Historian Hans De Geer contends that organised collaboration and cohesion were SAF 
goals in themselves. What he terms the principle of negotiation is based on collective 
agreements and on “employers joining together to control the price of labour”. The 
organisation, he says, was viewed as a cartel. Collective agreements were instruments for 
“honouring internal agreements and making the cartel itself respected”.
27 
An important study in this connection is ‘Managing the Managers’, an article by political 
scientist Peter Swenson.
28 He describes full employment, or shortage of labour, as the key 
factor in employer policy. Seen from this angle, he says, the employers acted in a 
“solidaristic” manner up until the 1970s. By this, he means they displayed a willingness to 
standardise and harmonise wage levels, etc, and to take action against breaches of contract. 
Official SAF policy, however, sometimes came into conflict with the actions of individual 
companies. “Segmentalistic” tendencies constantly emerged but were suppressed by the SAF. 
The tension between solidaristic and segmentalistic forces was manifested in the attempts by 
individual companies to circumvent solidarity by engaging in housing construction or other 
social activities for the purpose of retaining or attracting labour.  
Swenson’s use of the word ‘solidaristic’ is not dissimilar from the way other writers use 
the term cartel, in the sense of limiting competition.
29 Solidarity should thus be seen as a 
prerequisite for the existence of employer organisations. Other writers express this in such 
terms as employer organisations being “obliged to construct solidarity among their members, 
building coalitions among potentially conflicting interests which are redefined by the process 
of collective organisation itself”.
30 As we saw earlier, the VF developed its organisation in 
order to enhance mutuality, or solidarity, in what may be termed a cartel strategy. 
What in my view characterises an employer cartel is a situation in which competition over 
labour is present and the employers feel a need to introduce regulation. This type of 
competitive regulation involves both standardising the price, i.e. wages, and, possibly of equal 
importance, reducing labour mobility between undertakings. When such aims are regulated 
and organised within a collective employer framework, this could be described as a cartel 
strategy. In this context, then, an employer cartel is an organisation of employers that applies 
its cartel function or operates in accordance with an anti-competitive cartel strategy. The 
cartel function may be either active or inactive, depending largely on the current competitive 
situation in the labour market. This is strikingly similar to the traditional industrial cartels 
from the era when such groupings were legal in that they were usually organised in the form 
of trade associations. 
The collective dilemma in the horizontal dimension could be described as a cartel problem. 
Wage negotiations put a price on labour. Contractual wage increases were generally 
considered more than adequate in relation to productivity and international competitiveness. 
Nonetheless, wage drift was generally as great or greater than the contractual pay rises. This 
was viewed during the period as the main problem facing Swedish industry, and combating 
wage drift was felt to be a matter of the utmost urgency. The employers tried to solve the 
problem in many different ways but failed miserably. The cartel strategy, involving 
centralisation and closer control, had no effect. Full employment led to labour competition 
and strong unions capable of pursuing policies on behalf of low-wage groups.  
                                                 
26 Sisson 1991. 
27 De Geer 1992: 62. 
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29 Others, too, have emphasised the competitive dimension, see for instance Åmark 1986. 
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Wage drift was partly a result of a deliberate wage policy among businesses. Recruitment, 
for instance, often meant paying new employees a higher wage. Also, when the lowest wages 
were raised, management often re-set the pay scale accordingly. They felt justified in doing so 
as they wanted to preserve the wage differentials between unskilled and skilled labour. This 
was not a particularly serious issue until the industrial crises of the 1970s, which coincided 
with record pay increases. In 1975, the contractual wage increase was just over 10 per cent, 
yet wage drift was still 7 per cent. 
The wage drift issue touched upon a classic cartel problem. Companies competed with one 
another and the VF sought to regulate this competition. In order to solve the problem, 
collectively binding decisions were required, but the costs of establishing such a cartel would 
have been prohibitively high. What the VF could do was to try and raise consciousness and 
promote cohesion. At the same time, however, the engineering industry was divided on what 
powers to give the VF. The dividing line ran between centralisation and decentralisation. The 
outcome was a middle path: greater collaboration via ‘central steering’, which meant the VF 
organising at the local and regional level.  
The VF’s dilemma was also that while wage drift spelt economic trouble, it represented 
something that employers lauded in principle – the market principle. Consequently, they 
spoke in terms of rational wage drift that was to be based on productivity increases. This was 
a technical view of the market. The wage drift that the employers were contesting was based 
on the law of supply and demand: companies competing over labour. 
As the VF saw it, the solution to this horizontal problem lay in what we refer to here as the 
vertical dimension – the decentralisation of bargaining and an expanded regional organisation 
combined with local collaboration. 
 
Consequences of organisational development 
Organisations often make organisational changes. Does such organisational development have 
any important unforeseen consequences? In my view, development itself is often unforeseen. 
Here is an example. In the late 19
th century, the Swedish Brewers’ Association built up what 
was probably the best organised trade organisation of the day. The aim was to try and head off 
state regulation and taxes directed at the brewery industry. Although the brewers were 
remarkably well organised, the temperance movement in Sweden was stronger and won the 
ear of the politicians. The brewers’ organisational ability, however, was not wasted. It was put 
to use in creating and running a nationwide cartel embracing virtually every brewery in the 
country. This cartel would subsequently have an important structural impact on the industry.
31 
In the present study, we consider whether organisational change brought consequences for 
the employer collective. Employer policy was centralised for much of the period under 
review. The SAF’s power in the wages sphere was at its peak. Where regional or local 
organisations are small, there is often no alternative to central management. Decentralisation 
from central to local government, for instance, did not come about until Swedish 
municipalities had merged and acquired a particular size and level of proficiency. The move 
coincided with growing problems at the national level concerning information and 
administrative control. 
One view found in the literature is that broader-based representation in the SAF reinforced 
conflicts of interest, and that this greater heterogeneity weakened the organisation.
32 I have 
shown here that the need for decentralisation was a result both of increased complexity and 
control problems. In the 1980s, the SAF was a much larger organisation than in the 1950s 
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when centrally coordinated bargaining began. As the employer collective grew, the VF found 
it increasingly difficult to make its voice heard. 
By developing its organisation, building up its regional operation and enhancing local 
collaboration, the VF was able to go its own way. By 1983, it had grown much larger than in 
the 1950s. It could, of course, have broken away from the SAF without such organisational 
growth, but the question is whether it would have dared to do so. The question is hypothetical 
and difficult to answer. One thing is clear, however: having built up a larger organisation, the 
VF had developed such a degree of confidence and proficiency that its departure from the 
‘Swedish model’ did not seem to represent much of a risk. Originally, organisational 
development had been an attempt to solve the wage drift problem.  
In what way, then, was this development unforeseen? Full employment contributed to 
labour competition and an increasingly strong trade union movement. Employers began 
pursuing cartel policies to soften the impact. These policies were manifested in organisational 
changes, including the centralisation and coordination of wage negotiations. The outcome was 
disheartening. In response, a further organisational method was introduced, i.e. organisational 
development or growth. This involved broadening the SAF by bringing  in non-affiliated 
employer organisations. At the same time, the organisations began recruiting smaller 
businesses. This organisational approach in turn produced a situation in which it was difficult 
to reach agreements that suited everyone. Smaller undertakings, in particular, felt neglected. 
As time passed, wage drift tended to increase. The VF’s response was to introduce yet another 
organisational change. It expanded its regional and local operations and initiated local 
collaboration between members as a means of combating wage drift. This organisational 
process involved decentralisation and, in my view, represented an important step towards a 
new employer policy.  
This new employer policy may be seen as a result of several different developments: the 
radicalisation of the LO and social democracy in the 1970s, the growing importance of the 
large engineering companies for the Swedish economy, and at the same time greater 
international competition, new production methods and new work processes. But the present 
study also shows that the internal development of the employers’ organisations and policies is 
a key to understanding both why and when the changes occurred. 
The VF strengthened its organisation significantly during the period. The employers were 
not weakened to the extent claimed in the literature.
33 Rather, it was a case of the unions 
growing in strength and acquiring greater influence, as shown by the employment legislation 
introduced in the 1970s. In organisational terms, professionalism became widespread among 
employers, especially in the VF. Decentralisation in an increasingly complex world involving 
negotiations with three equally competent partners – the union bodies representing blue-collar 
workers, white-collar workers and graduate engineers – imposed greater demands on the 
organisation than the bargaining at association level had done in the 1950s. The employers’ 
increased organisational strength, therefore, enabled them to dismantle the central bargaining 
setup. This strength derived from an organisational development that largely grew out of a 
need to solve the competitive and collaborative problems associated with wage drift. 
In my opinion, therefore, the study illustrates the close link between market mechanisms 
and institutional change in the form of organisational development or growth. The VF sought 
the solution to market problems in organisational change or development, and in the 
organisation of bargaining. The importance of past experience and organisational growth for 
the new employer policy, therefore, should not be underrated. As I see it, this organisational 
explanation goes a step further than the functionalist explanations that view the new employer 
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policy as simply a result of new needs arising out of the transformation of production and 
stiffer international competition.  
The decentralisation and growing marketisation of wages that began in the 1980s and was 
accentuated in the 1990s is what I refer to as the new employer policy. We should bear in 
mind, however, that these ideas were not new. Individual companies complied with the laws 
of the market by competing over labour, in direct contravention of the collective cartel 
strategy. This led to wage drift. The new employer policy could therefore be described as 




The way the labour market functions is a crucial factor in any analysis of the Swedish model. 
Full employment contributed to the growth of what were probably the two most important 
institutions in this model: centralised negotiations between the social partners and, secondly, 
the Rehn-Meidner model, involving pay policies based on solidarity with the low-paid. Here, 
we have examined the role of the employers in the rise, application and fall of the centralised 
bargaining model. In this respect, the Swedish Metal Trades Employers’ Association (VF), 
the largest and most important employer organisation in the SAF, was the actor whose 
interests eventually led to the model’s demise. The principal cause was discontent over the 
way this bargaining model worked in practice. The engineering industries felt their interests 
were being neglected in the giant employer collective. As the SAF swelled out, the relative 
influence of these industries declined, despite the fact that their relative importance for the 
Swedish economy was growing. In the early 1980s, they chose to break away from centralised 
bargaining and negotiate by themselves with their own partners. A few years later, the SAF 
followed suit and terminated its bargaining operation. One of the institutions of the Swedish 
model had thereby met its end. 
Empirical investigations of the employer organisations’ internal actions such as the one 
that the present article is based on are few and far between. The method used here, combining 
economic history with organisation theory, has been used to study the SAF but not the 
employer organisations. I would argue that the present study shows that the importance of the 
market mechanism for employer policy during full employment has been underrated. When 
full employment was present, companies competed over labour, which drove up pay, not least 
through wage drift.  
For 30 years, the VF sought a solution to the problem of wage drift. Significantly, it began 
by helping to push through centralised bargaining in the 1950s. Thereafter, its principal 
antidote to wage drift was greater regional organisation and local collaboration between 
employers. For a long time, the cartel collaboration that came about as a result of full 
employment – at both SAF and VF level – yielded no benefits whatsoever in the form of 
reduced wage drift. When wage drift subsequently showed a tendency to decline towards the 
end of the 1970s, this was seen as a result of more extensive local and regional organisation. 
Competition and wage drift, it was felt, could be handled better through local collaboration 
than through large-scale collective action. This approach was not a total success, but instead – 
and unintentionally – the growth of regional organisation enabled the VF to break out of the 
centralised bargaining system that it had helped to create. It would thus be fair to say that the 
importance of organisation was unintended, and that full employment and labour competition 
were the principal catalysts.  
 
 




The study is built up on documents from the Swedish Metal Trades Employers’ Association (VF). 
More detailed references are to be found in Lundqvist 2000, below.    
 
Literature 
Albåge, L-G. 1996. En medlares tankar inför 2000-talet, in Verkstadsindustrin, lönebildningen och 
framtiden. Stockholm: Sveriges Verkstadsindustrier. 
Arbetsmarknadsstatistisk årsbok 1994. Stockholm: SCB.  
Bergom Larsson, M. 1985. Den svenska modellen ur branschperspektiv, in Fred eller fejd. 
Stockholm: SAF. 
De Geer, H. 1986. SAF i förhandlingar. Stockholm: SAF. 
De Geer, H. 1992. Arbetsgivarna. SAF i tio decennier. Stockholm: SAF. 
Erixon. L ed. 2003. den svenska modellen ekonomiska politik. Stockholm: Atlas. 
Jerneck, M. 1986. SAFs framtidssyn: förutsägelser, målsättningar och dilemman. Stockholm: SAF. 
Johansson, A. L. & L. Magnusson 1998. LO andra halvseklet. Fackföreningsrörelsen och 
samhället. Stockholm: Atlas. 
Kjellberg, A. 2000. Arbetsgivarstrategier i Sverige under 100 år, i Arbetsgivere i Norden. En 
sociologisk analyse af arbejdsgiverorganiseringen i Norge, Sverige, Finland og Danmark. 
Köpenhamn: Nordisk Ministerråd. 
Kuuse, J. 1986.  Strukturomvandlingen och arbetsmarknadens organisering. SAF och dess 
motparter i en förändrad omvärld. Stockholm: SAF. 
Lindvall, J. 2004. The politics of purpose: Swedish macroeconomic policy after the golden age. 
Göteborg. 
Lundqvist, T. 1995. Den stora ölkartellen. Branschorganisering och kartellbildning i 
bryggeriindustrin 1885-1914. Uppsala: Acta. 
Lundqvist, T. 1998a. The Making of a National Cartel in the Swedish Brewing Industry 1885-1908. 
Scandinavian Economic History Review 46 (3): 42-63. 
Lundqvist, T. 1998b. Arbetsgivarna efter 1945 – arbetskraftsbrist och kartellstrategi. 
Verkstadsföreningen samt Bryggeriarbetsgivareförbundet och SAF. Arbetslivsrapport 1998:38, 
Stockholm: Institute for Working Life.  
Lundqvist, T. 2000. Arbetsgivarpolitik under full sysselsättning. En ekonomisk–historisk studie av 
Verkstadsföreningen 1946-1983.  Uppsala: SMIF. 
Lundqvist, T. 2003. Konkurrensvisionens framväxt: konkurrenspolitik, intressen och politisk kultur. 
Stockholm: Institute for Futures Studies. 
Lundqvist, T. 2004. Organised Interests, Labour Markets and Migration: the Swedish Model. 
Working Paper 2004:3, Institute for Futures Studies. 
Magnusson, L. 2000. An economic history of Sweden. London: Routledge. 
Meidner, R. 1994. The Rise and the Fall of the Swedish Model, in Clement, W. & R. Mahon, 
Swedish Social Democracy: A Model in Transition. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. 
Olsson, U. 1971. Regionala löneskillnader inom svensk verkstadsindustri 1913-1963. Göteborg. 
Rothstein, B. 2000. Socialt kapital i den socialdemokratiska staten. Den svenska modellen och det 
civila samhället. Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia nr 79.  
Schmitter, P. & W. Streeck eds. 1985. Private Interest Government. Beyond markets and the state. 
Beverly Hills. 
Sisson, K. 1991. Employers’ Organisations and Industrial Relations: The Significance of the 
Strategies of Large Companies, in Sadowski D. & O. Jacobi eds., Employers’ Associations in 
Europé: Policy and Organisation. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Stråth, B. 1998. Mellan två fonder. LO och den svenska modellen. Stockholm: Atlas. 
Styrman, G. 1946. Verkstadsföreningen 1896-1945. Stockholm. 
Swenson, P. 1992. Managing the Managers. The Swedish Employers’ Confederation, Labor 
Scarcity, and the Supression of Labor Market Segmentation. Scandinavian Journal of History, 
vol. 16.   20
Tolliday, S & J. Zeitlin 1991. Employers and industrial relations between theory and history, in  
Tolliday, S. & J. Zeitlin eds., The Power to Manage? Employers and industrial relations in 
comparative-historical perspective. London/New York: Routledge. 
van Waarden, F. 1992. Emergence and Development of Business Interest Associations. An 
Example from The Netherlands. Organization Studies, 13:4. 
Åmark, K. 1986. Facklig makt och fackligt medlemskap. Lund: Arkiv. 
Kuuse, J. 1986.  Strukturomvandlingen och arbetsmarknadens organisering. SAF och dess 







Former Working Papers: 
 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:1 
Malmberg, Bo & Lena Sommestad. Heavy trends in global developments. Idea platform for 
MISTRA’s future strategy. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:2 
Malmberg, Bo & Lena Sommestad. Tunga trender i den globala utvecklingen. Uppdrag för 
Stiftelsen för Miljöstrategisk forskning (MISTRA). 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:3 
Lee, Ronald, Mason, Andrew & Timothy Miller. From Transfers to Individual Responsibility: 
Implications for Savings and Capital Accumulation in Taiwan and the United States. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:4 
Mayer, David. On the Role of Health in the Economic and Demographic Dynamics of Brazil, 
1980-1995. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:5 
Galor, Oded & Omer Moav. Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2000:6 
Malmberg, Bo & Lena Sommestad. Four Phases in the Demographic Transition, Implications 
for Economic and Social Development in Sweden, 1820-2000. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:1 
Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter. From Malthus to Modern Growth: Can Epidemics Explain the Three 
Regimes? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:2 
Sommestad, Lena. Education and Research in Times of Population Ageing. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:3 
Sommestad, Lena. Health and Wealth: The Contribution of Welfare State Policies to 
Economic Growth. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:4 
Westholm, Erik. Det utmanade lokalsamhället. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:5 
Westholm, Erik. Challenges for the Local Communities. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2001:6 
Sommestad, Lena i samarbete med Bo Malmberg. Demografi och politisk kultur. Ett 
ekonomiskt-historiskt perspektiv på ”den starka statens fall”. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:1 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn. Arbetskraft och konkurrensbegränsning: aktörsperspektiv på den svenska 
modellen och framtiden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:2 
Simon, Paul. Demography and Finance – Finance and Growth. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:3 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn. Den starka alkoholstatens fall.  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:4 
Olsson, Stefan. Vad är nytt under solen? Om problemet med att veta vad som är nytt i 
historien och samhället. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:5 
Andersson, Jenny. Alva’s Futures Ideas in the construction of Swedish Futures Studies. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:6 
Essén, Anna. Svensk invandring och arbetsmarknaden. Återblick och nuläge. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:7 
Barnekow, Erik. Demografi och finansmarknad – en översikt av empirisk forskning. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:8 
Karlström, Anders, Palme, Mårten och Ingemar Svensson. The Timing of Retirement and 
Social Security Reforms: Measuring Individual Welfare Changes. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:9 
Palme, Mårten och Ingemar Svensson. Pathways to Retirement and Retirement Incentives in 
Sweden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2002:10 
Ranehill, Eva. Social snedrekrytering till högre studier. – En litteraturöversikt.  
ISSN 1652-120X 
ISBN 91-89655-60-5 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:1 
Korpi, Martin. Regionala obalanser – ett demografiskt perspektiv. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:2 
Rydell, Ingrid. Demographic Patterns from the 1960s in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:3 
Dahlberg, Susanne & Ruth-Aïda Nahum. Cohort Effects on Earnings Profiles: Evidence from 
Sweden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:4 
Malmberg, Bo & Thomas Lindh. Swedish post-war economic development. The role of age 
structure in a welfare state. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:5 
Essen, Anna. Kvarboende och äldrevård I hemmet med modern teknik. –Vad hämmar 
utvecklingen? 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:6 
Ramstedt, Berith. Free movers som resurs och strategi –utländska studenter i det svenska 
utbildningssystemet. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:7 
Daumerie, Béatrice. What future for Europe? New perspectives in post-industrial fertility 
issues. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:8 
Thalberg, Sara. Demographic Patterns in Europe. A review of Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:9 
Wasmer, Etienne. Interpreting Europe and US labor markets differences: the specificity of 
human capital investments. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:10 
Hrdlicka, Anna. The future of housing and technology in Japan – the Connected Homes Group 
Study Tour. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:11 
Thalberg, Sara. Barnafödandets politik. – En analys  av partiernas argumentation i 
nativitetsfrågan 1997-2003. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:12 
Westholm, Erik. Leaving Rurality Behind. Re-orientation of spatial policies in Sweden.  
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2003:13 
Amcoff, Jan. Regional befolkningsomfördelning bland unga och gamla. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:1 
•  Gartell, Marie & Håkan Regnér, Inkomstpremier av lärosäten för män och kvinnor som tog en 
examen under 1990-talet. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:2 
Barnekow, Carl, Diskriminering i den statliga sektorn? - En utvärdering av det statliga 
pensionssystemet. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:3 
Lundqvist, Torbjörn, Organised Interests, Labour Market and Migration: the Swedish Model. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:4 
Westholm, Erik, Modes of re-territorialisation, Spatial implications of regional competition 
politics in Sweden. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:5 
Malmberg, Bo & Thomas Lindh, Forecasting global growth by age structure projections. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:6 
Blomquist, Sören & Vidar Christiansen, Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of 
Publicly Provided Day Care. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2004:7 
Malmberg, Bo & Thomas Lindh, Demographically based global income forecasts up to the 
year 2050. 
•  Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2005:1 
Lundberg, Urban, Social Democracy Lost – The Social Democratic Party in Sweden and the 
Politics of Pension Reform, 1978-1998. 
 